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Abstract - In this paper, we discuss open issues regarding certification, auto-configuration 
and authentication of routing messages for mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET). We 
describe and discuss existing models for these operations and highlight their specific 
problems. Considering routing protocols usage, we propose new solutions based on 
protocol modifications and distributed certifications that can be integrated to establish 
trust relationships for MANET operation and utilization.
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I.INTRODUCTION
WIRELESS networks are defined as computer 
networks connected through wireless links, such as 
radio frequencies and infrared rays. Wireless local 
area networks (WLANs) have arisen with the main 
purpose of overcoming the limitations imposed by 
traditional wired networks, thus permitting faster 
network installations and mobility at lower costs. 
According to the IEEE 802.11 standard [1], WLANs 
can be classified as access point-dependent 
networks (infrastructured) or independent 
networks (ad-hoc). In an infrastructured WLAN 
all communications among mobile nodes (MNs) 
travel through one or more mobile support 
stations (MSSs) and usually at least one MSS has 
a direct connection to a wired network. In this 
situation, MNs cannot communicate to each other 
directly.
In Ad Hoc WLANs, referred as Mobile Ad 
Hoc NETworks (MANETs) by the The Internet 
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Engineering Task Force (IETF) [1], MNs can 
communicate with each other directly because 
there is no MSS. Inside a MANET, MNs do not 
require any physical infrastructure, and the 
nodes can move freely because there is no central 
communication point. A MANET can operate in 
isolation or as an extension of some preinstalled 
wired network, which, in this case, requires a 
communication gateway to connect the attached 
ad-hoc networks.
MANETs are used mainly when a fixed wired 
network cannot be installed, or if wired networks 
are not well-suited. This can be during a natural 
disaster situation (hurricanes and earthquakes), 
when rescue teams must setup coordination and 
communication systems quickly. Other scenarios 
that require MANETs include battlefield exchange 
of tactical information among soldiers, police 
operations, information sharing in business 
meetings and student interactions in computer- 
supported classrooms.
MANETs are advantageous because they are 
quick to install (regardless of location because they 
require no previous infrastructure nor a fixed base 
to route messages) and provide fault tolerance 
(any malfunction or disconnection of a station can 
be solved with a dynamic reconfiguration of the 
network), connectivity (if two stations are inside 
the same area within reach of radio waves, there 
is a communication channel), mobility and other 
characteristics.
However, these characteristics impose fragilities 
that are important in these networks. The IETF 
Request for Comment (RFC) 2501 [2] explains how 
these fragilities are related to dynamic topologies, 
restricted bandwidths and variable link capacities, 
power save consumption operations and limited 
physical security. Consequently, MANETs require 
proper specifications involving certification, 
authentication, configuration and routing in order 
to sustain trust relationships in these networks.
In this paper, some proposals [3]–[5] related to 
certification and auto-configuration are presented 
and discussed. The problems in these models are 
emphasized and some solutions are highlighted 
regarding auto-configuration and the deployment 
of distributed certification authorities (CA). The 
integration of these functions is shown to be 
necessary for MANET to be a trust environment. 
II. MANET Routing Protocols
Routing protocols are responsible for finding, 
establishing and maintaining routes among MNs 
that must communicate. It is very important for 
routing protocols in MANET to exchange as few 
messages as possible to avoid network overhead 
(bandwidth network usage) and in order to save 
power. These combined factors are related directly 
to the performance of the routing protocols. 
Different techniques have been developed to 
optimize the time for some routing protocols to 
create and establish routes. Other protocols were 
optimized to consume less bandwidth but require 
more time to establish a specific route.
According to the IETF MANET workgroup 
[1], there is a desirable quality list that routing 
protocols must supply with: (a) distributed 
operation, (b) no routing loops, (c) under demand 
operations, (d) pro-active operation, (e) security, (f) 
inactivity period operation and (g) unidirectional 
link support.
In general, MANET routing protocols can be 
classified as reactive and pro-active. Pro-active 
routing protocols store information about routes 
to every MN in the network. Reactive protocols only 
create a route when it is requested by an origin 
node. Four routing protocols are specified by 
IETF with RFC drafts: (a) Topology Dissemination 
Based on Reverse-Path Forwarding (TBRPF) [6], (b) 
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) [7], 
(c) Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing 
(AODV) [8], and (d) Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
[9]. Drafts (a) and (b) are considered pro-active 
routing protocols, while (c) and (d) are reactive 
routing protocols.
The TBRPF creates per hop routing by the 
shortest path for each destination. Each MN 
running TBRPF generates a topology information 
tree database that is saved in a topology table. 
To minimize network processing, each MN 
reports only a small portion of its topology 
table to a neighbor MN. TBRFP uses different 
combinations and periodical updates to keep 
every MN informed about its own topology tree. 
To reach and maintain robustness in highly mobile 
environments, the protocol allows each MN to 
send additional information (complete topology 
tree) to its neighbors.
The TBRPF can be divided into two main 
modules. The first module, termed “neighbor 
discovery”, discovers and learns information 
about neighboring nodes. The second module, 
called “routing”, performs topology discovery 
and computes the routes to every destination. 
Differentiated HELLO messages are used for 
neighbor discovery and contain only information 
about a specific neighbor change. This results in 
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shorter messages for a link state algorithm.
The key concept of the OLSR is the use of 
multipoint relays (MPRs). MPRs are MNs selected 
to forward and broadcast OLSR messages, thus 
constituting a flooding mechanism. MPRs are spread 
throughout MANET to provide every MN with the 
partial information about the necessary topologies for 
computing the best route to every MN in the network. 
MPRs, combined with local duplicity avoidance, are 
used to minimize the number of control packets that 
should be sent in the network. OLSR is projected to 
work with highly scalable networks where traffic is 
sporadic and randomly distributed among the MNs. 
As a pro-active protocol, it is also appropriate for 
scenarios in which MN pairs change often, because 
no additional control packet is generated in the 
network since the routes are maintained and known 
by all possible destinations.
 The AODV is based on the Destination-
Sequenced Distance Vector Routing Algorithm 
(DSDV) protocol. The AODV is classified as 
distance-vector algorithm and is considered a 
reactive protocol because a route is created out of 
necessity. In general, the AODV tries to eliminate 
the broadcast routing message flooding, which 
in turn limits its own scalability. The AODV also 
tries to minimize latency when new routes are 
requested. Its functions are similar to traditional 
algorithms, including a feature to facilitate 
the interconnection with wired networks. Even 
though it adheres closely to traditional protocols, 
the AODV allows multicast and unicast traffic; 
however the protocol shows only one route to 
every destination, which constitutes a restrictive 
characteristic.
The DSR is a simple and efficient routing 
protocol designed for multi-hop MANETs with 
up to 200 MNs and supports high mobility 
rates. It allows the network to organize itself 
and auto-configure without any infrastructure 
administration. DSR is divided into two main 
modules called “routing discovery” and “routing 
maintenance” that work together to permit the 
MN to discover and maintain updated routes. 
All aspects of the protocol operate on demand, 
thus eliminating periodical routing information 
exchange. This characteristic reduces network 
bandwidth consumption and saves power. The 
DSR also permits multiple routes to a specific 
destination, allows every sender to select and 
control the used routes, provides loop-free 
routing information, supports unidirectional links 
and presents fast convergence when the network 
topology changes. 
Noteworthy is the common characteristic 
of the four described protocols to ensure that 
nodes can trust the critical operation of routing. 
These protocols all require functions for node 
identification and message authentication, issues 
that are discussed herein. 
III. Message Authentication within 
Routing Protocols
For the routing infrastructure to be trusted 
and thus to avoid malfunctioning in MANET, it 
is necessary to secure the routing messages. An 
authentication service for routing protocols is 
proposed in [10] and [11], in which an extension 
header – the MANET Authentication Extension 
(MAE) – is prefixed to every message of the 
routing protocol. All necessary information to 
authentication is included in the MAE. The main 
focus of the proposed model was to maintain the 
routing packets and their messages in unchanged 
formats, regardless of the specific protocol.
The MAE format includes tree protocol fields. 
Two of these fields are used to control the MAE 
itself (the MSG_TYPE field is used to differentiate 
MAE messages from other routing protocol 
messages and the MSG_LENGTH field indicates the 
size of MAE in bytes). The remaining field (AUTH_
OBJECTS) carries authentication information, 
such as message authentication code, signer 
certificate, hash chains and sequence number. To 
ensure trust within the MANET, the production 
and verification of these objects must rely on 
the correct identification, authentication and 
certification of nodes, which brings the issue of 
operating these functions in a fully distributed 
ad-hoc environment.
IV. Distributed Certification
The MANET characteristics render a centralized 
certification service ill-suited for these networks. 
Instead, the distributed certification models 
present a more appropriate solution. Some 
existing models [3, 12 and 13] use threshold 
cryptography theory and pro-active secret key 
updates based on the Shamir schema [14]. This 
schema is fully distributed and the service is 
based on a node coalition approach and uses a 
cryptographic system that fully obeys the RSA 
model.
The certification models consider a MANET in 
which every MN vi has its RSA key pair {ski ,pki}, 
where ski=<di,ni> and pki=<ei ,ni> are respectively 
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the private and public keys to be used in point-to-
point transactions.
The distributed certification authority (CA) has 
a key pair {SK,PK}, where SK=<d,n> is used to sign 
all MN certificates. Any certificate in this approach 
can be verified using the system public key SK 
that is known by every MN in the network.
According to threshold cryptography, SK is 
divided in the network. Every MN vi, besides its 
own key pair, has the partial key Pvi. Any subgroup 
k of n nodes can work as a CA. However, it is not 
possible to any MN to know the whole SK, except 
during the schema initialization. 
Threshold cryptography is indicated to 
MANET as a result of some of its proprieties: 
(a) the distribution and decentralized control of 
the keys fits the profile of ad hoc networks, (b) 
security omnipresence is guaranteed since the 
secret is fully distributed in the network and 
intrusion detection is more practical and efficient, 
(c) the limit k is the balance between the service 
availability and intrusion tolerance. In other 
words, a group of adversaries need to destroy 
(n – k +1) partial key holders to bring the system 
down (once the network auto-configuration 
becomes impossible without these nodes) and 
at least obtain k partial keys to steal the SK. 
The system initialization is a critical step and 
includes choosing carefully the value of k . The 
lower the k  value, the easier it is for an intruder 
to obtain the secret SK. Inversely, the greater 
the k value, the higher is the system security 
level, although this reduces fault tolerance 
simultaneously, since the closer k is from n, the 
greater is the probability of (n – k +1) MN leaving 
the network; an event that would block the 
certification service.
A certificate generated by a CA is formed 
by parts of SK coming from a subgroup of k 
MNs, and is used for certifying a MN public 
key, as in a normal RSA cryptographic 
system. Therefore, every MN has its own 
SK signed certificate, certi=<vi,pki,Tsing,Texpire>, 
comprising the MN identifier vi, its public key 
pki, the signature date Tsing and the certificate 
expiration date Texpire . 
Two methods are used to control the certificate 
validity: (a) implicit certificate revocation stating 
that every MN must renew its certificate at least 
every Trenew period, where Texpire ≤ Tsing + Trenew, (b) explicit 
certificate revocation where a certificate registered 
in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is not valid yet 
its Texpire is valid, which implies that only revoked 
certificates that did not expire must be in the CRL.
As implemented in [3], this model involves 
only subgroups, k size, of partial key holders. 
The basic operations include: (a) secret key 
negotiation, where the secret key can be obtained 
by a MN in the system initialization or by using the 
auto-configuration service (in the first case, both 
keys and certificates are distributed to MN by a 
central negotiator before MANET formation; in 
the second case, an auto initialization algorithm 
where k MN can provide a partial key to a new 
MN in the network), (b) secret key update, instead 
of changing the system key periodically, the 
operation only changes the partial key with the 
main purpose of protecting the secret key from 
breaking. This model supports k-1 partial secret 
breaks because SK is obtained with k keys. If in an 
update situation there are fewer than k  discovered 
keys, SK is protected and does not need to be 
changed, (c) the certification service permits that 
when a MN starts using the certification service, 
one subgroup of k partial secret key holders (one 
coalition) is created and every MN vi generates a 
partial signed certificate to the requesting MN. 
This one then generates its certificate by grouping 
k received certificates that represents a SK signed 
certificate. This service includes emission, 
renovation and revocation of certificates, and the 
setting of a security policy for each step, even 
before the MANET is formed. 
V. Auto-configuration
In order for a MN to communicate in a network 
it must have a unique identifier, usually the 
IP address. However, in MANET the topology 
changes dynamically, thus creating difficulties 
for centralized administration to distribute IP 
addresses or any other identifier. This situation 
leads to a distributed, dynamic and automatic 
service.
Auto-configuration provides a service that 
renders MANET more efficient and robust. Even 
though there are many approaches related to 
auto-configuration, none has been standardized. 
A proposed auto-configuration model [4] uses 
message authentication supported by a distributed 
CA, according to models such as those presented 
by Silveira et al. [3], Luo et al. [12] and Kong et 
al. [13]. The presence of a distributed CA avoids 
the possibility that any intruder MN can produce 
messages or even change the messages already 
created with the purpose of breaking the protocol 
or rendering the service unavailable. The approach 
by Buiati [4] requires that the MN is configured 
Towards Establishing Trust in MANET
37
previously with a valid certificate before they can 
request and join the auto-configuration service. 
Therefore, for a MN to request an IP address or 
even respond to a client MN solicitation, that MN 
must have a valid certificate. The authentication 
service of the auto-configuration mechanism is 
supplied using the same MAE described above 
for routing in MANET, which has all the necessary 
information to guarantee authenticity, integrity 
and non-repudiation in all MAE protected 
messages.
The MAE contains authentication objects 
which includes a mandatory digital signature 
(DS) and authenticates all non-mutable fields of 
auto-configuration messages. The MAE should 
have one more object that can be the certificate. 
The message sender DS is obtained with the 
sender private key because the certificate that 
accompanies the MAE has the sender public key 
that can be used to certify the message sender. 
If the MN certificate is not locally available, MAE 
can possess a CERT object, which carries with the 
message the certificate that created and signed 
the MAE. Additional objects are used to provide 
additional services that are beyond the protocol 
auto-configuration approach.
Every NM that is valid and trusted to a specific 
MANET has an IP address identifying its interface, 
and a subset of free IP addresses (FIAs) to offer to 
MN clients that wish to associate to the network. 
Within a particular MANET, a MN FIA must be 
distinguished from other MN FIAs to avoid 
multiple MNs distributing the same IP address. 
Additionally, every MANET has a unique identifier 
defined as partition ID (PID), which permits that 
a MN having the same PID as other MN consider 
both MN in the same MANET. The PID also helps 
to distinguish different MANETs that share a 
specific area, and is a parameter that is necessary 
to control the fusion of MANETs.
The Dynamic Configuration Distribution 
Protocol (DCDP) is used to distribute network 
configuration information such as IP address, 
network mask and default gateway. The DCDP uses 
binary division to provide to distinct IP address 
for MNs in the network. Binary division assures 
that all MNs receive distinguished IP addresses, 
thus avoiding IP address conflicts even when two 
or more MANETs are fused.
As stated by Buiati [4], in order to obtain 
and associate an IP address the MN must have 
received its valid certificate. When a MN wishes to 
join a MANET so that it can obtain an IP address, it 
broadcasts an ADDR_REQ message using its MAC 
address as the source address. Any MN belonging 
to the MANET answers the message with an 
ADDR_REP that contains a FIA with the largest 
free IP quantity because a MN can have more than 
one FIA with different address quantities. The MN 
can receive more than one answer from the other 
MNs, and then selects the MN that has the largest 
FIA by sending a SERVER_POOL message directly 
to the chosen MN server, thus discarding all other 
received messages.
The SERVER_POOL message confirms the 
intention of the requesting MN for obtaining an 
IP address. The elected MN server then divides its 
FIA, sending one-half to the MN that requested it 
and keeping the other half for answering future 
requests. The requesting MN receives the FIA 
throughout the IP_ASSIGNED message and stores 
the free IP addresses in its own FIA, reserving the 
first IP address for itself (if it possesses more than 
on FIA, the MN must mark which FIA has its own 
address). The remaining addresses may be used 
to answer other MN client requests. The process 
is completed using an IP_ASSIGNEMENT_OK 
message to the server MN.
VI. Open Issues and Proposed Solutions
As discussed above, the integration of auto-
configuration, certification and authentication is 
imperative for establishing trust in MANET. The 
models described, though bringing effective 
solutions to each of these operations, present 
open issues to be resolved. A fully distributed 
MANET certification authority can be created and 
implemented [3], but it depends and relies on 
the value of k, which describes the size of a MN 
group capable of holding the parts that constitute 
a SK key. During MANET operations this implies 
directly that MN must be reached so that a MN 
can have its certificate signed. If k
 
MANET are 
not reached, the MN cannot join the MANET 
because it cannot sign its requests. A routing 
protocol should then be used to reach k  MN, thus 
permitting the certificate signature.
Another problem related to k is its fixed 
arbitrary value, the definition of which is relative 
to two empirical heuristics: (a) k cannot have a 
large value (close to the total number of MNs in 
the MANET ), because this brings a reachability 
issue and reduces fault tolerance, and (b) k  
cannot have a very small value (considering the 
number of MNs in MANET), because this increases 
the vulnerability of SK. However, the number of 
nodes in a MANET  is possibly highly variable, 
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thus implying that an adequately defined k  value 
may become inadequate considering that some 
number of MNs can leave or join the MANET  at 
anytime.
An initial solution is that k may vary as a 
function of a percentage of the network actual 
size. However, to be able to modify k  dynamically 
it is important to define a maximum and a 
minimum value (both related to a percentage of 
the network size) that should be chosen according 
to the security constraints of the network. 
Moreover, these values should be monitored 
during the MANET operation, whether they are 
growing or decreasing, given that if a minimum 
or a maximum value is reached, it is necessary 
to redefine the limits for k . Given these limits, 
according to the analyses of the results obtained 
in [3], the value of k  can be defined as an average 
of the maximum and the minimum sizes.
Still considering that k may vary periodically, the 
model requires improvements in the CRL because 
the number of revoked certificates would be much 
larger once the number of used certificates is fully 
dependent on k. The more the value of k varies, 
the more frequent is the emission of revoked 
certificates and the requests and emissions of 
new certificates. This generates more traffic in 
the network, thus forcing the MNs to process new 
certificates, thereby leading to increased power 
consumption and a longer CRL list.
Moreover, as MNs enter and leave the network, 
the dynamic variation of k implies each time to 
return to the CA initialization stage because the k  
parts of SK must change. A centralized approach 
for the process of CA initialization is possible [3], 
but contradicts the MANET requirement of fully 
distributed services. A new model of a distributed 
CA, aware of periodical changes of k, requires a 
mathematical model for the computation of a new 
SK in a distributed environment.
Additionally, there is the issue of reaching 
k MNs for a new node to be accepted in the 
MANET. These MNs can be reached using routing 
protocols with the signature based on a previous 
requested certificate. This problem requires a MN 
to work as a proxy, acting in other MN’s names 
and representing k - 1 MN to sign the certificate 
request. If a proxy MN already has a valid 
configuration in the network, it could provide 
signed certificates even if the k - 1 nodes cannot 
be reached otherwise.
Another approach considers that a temporary 
IP address can be used to request the certificate 
signature. This implies that a topology change is 
required due to the temporary IP chosen by the 
MN. To solve this problem, a range of IP network 
address (even in CIDR) could be allocated and 
announced in the network informing that if a MN 
wishes to sign a certificate so it can join MANET, 
it then should use an IP address range reserved 
to that finality.
In this situation, the OLSR could be used 
as routing protocol because of its pro-active 
characteristic, in addition to the information 
messages, the reserved IP range could be 
announced by the MPRs. A time-to-live (TTL) 
should be limited to 2 or 3 hops because it is 
highly probable that k - 1 nodes could be contacted 
at these distances by routing, thus limiting the 
certification signature-related traffic. In fact, any 
pro-active routing protocol could be used in this 
situation once the routing information is easily 
created, because the IP range would be well-
known in the network. 
Although the model by Buiati [4] uses the 
distributed CA approach implemented by Silveira 
et al. [3], the routing considerations where not 
applied there, thus limiting the extent of the 
proposed auto-configuration model, which 
assumes that the MN already possesses a 
valid signed certificate. Another problem in 
Buiati’s model [4] is that the auto-configuration 
operation assumes that every message sent in 
the network is a broadcast message. This auto-
configuration model does not scale well because 
in a large MANET the number of messages would 
increase significantly, creating problems related 
to unnecessary bandwidth consumption and 
increasing power consumption by the MNs.
To resolve this specific problem, the protocol 
should be altered so that only the first message is 
broadcast to all nearby MNs. In this message, the 
MAC address of the MN goes with the frame. As the 
destination MN receives the sender MAC address, 
the other messages in the communication process 
can be conducted using unicast addressing, thus 
avoiding network flooding. 
VII. Conclusion
 MANET utilization is increasing at a rapid pace, 
but critical problems remain unresolved. Specific 
problems related to auto-configuration, routing 
metrics and distributed certification are increas-
ing as MANET standards are developed.
 The approaches by Silveira [3] and Buiati 
[4] evaluated herein present open issues to be 
solved. Our proposed solutions consider routing 
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and other protocol modifications to integrate 
solutions for auto-configuration, certification and 
authentication.
An approach such as that proposed by Buiati 
[4], that relies in a static value k as the number 
of parts for a group key SK, is not adequate 
for MANET as the number of MNs cannot be 
predicted readily. On the other hand, k  is defined 
by considering an expected number of nodes 
n. As the real n increases or reduces, k  cannot 
vary because the entire process needs to restart 
to allow the SK secret key creation, which is a 
centralized process. A new envisioned solution is 
based on the idea that relies on a fully distributed 
CA initialization approach so that k can vary 
according to the requirements of MANET. It 
is important to note that this model should be 
validated mathematically, an issue that we are 
considering for future work. 
Silveira et al. [3] contends that the routing 
metrics required to reach k nodes is not considered 
because it assumes that all nodes are close to the 
requesting MN, which in MANET may not be true 
due to the mobility of nodes. The present paper 
proposes a solution whereby routing protocols 
can be used by proxy nodes to reach k MNs in 
order to produce a signed certificate.
The auto-configuration model, based on 
broadcast messages during the entire auto-
configuration process, should be altered in order 
to avoid unnecessary bandwidth consumption and 
power consumption. Once the first message is sent, 
the MAC address of the sender can be obtained 
easily, and the consequent communication can 
continue using unicast messages.
Towards establishing trust in MANET, an 
integrated approach for auto-configuration, 
authentication and certification is needed. In this 
paper we propose solutions for this integration 
to be obtained effectively, while respecting the 
specific characteristics of MANET, namely the 
mobility of nodes, the dynamic of node presence, 
the particular connectivity and associated 
restrictions regarding power consumption, 
restricted bandwidth and limited physical 
security.
There is evidence that the integration of auto-
configuration, authentication and certification 
results in accrued complexity for MANET nodes, 
with several factors to be considered and 
involving mutually dependent operations. Based 
on discussions of trust in [15], it can be argued 
that the explicit consideration of trust among 
nodes is a means for reducing the complexity in 
the MANET environment. 
However, the concept of trust [16] remains 
an open subject and implies the need for more 
study in areas such as collecting and distributing 
information specific to trust, monitoring nodes 
behavior, storing memories of trust, proving and 
establishing the reputation of nodes, among other 
subjects that we are considering for future work.
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